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The Centenary Commemorations 
of the Great War in Belgium
History and the Politics of Memory
nico wouters
As the start of the centenary commemoration of the First World War (wwi) in 
2014 drew closer, Belgium saw the rise of a bigger ‘commemorative competition’. 
The different governments launched their own commemorative programmes, 
parallel to (and sometimes against) each other. In the slipstream of this, a huge 
commercial and business competition erupted in a struggle for funding and visitors. 
There was also an unprecedented funding of new academic wwi-research. This 
contribution first makes some remarks on this research, and then looks briefly 
at the commemorative and memorial policies. On the one hand, current wwi 
policies confirm (and reinforce) the differences in similar policies related to the 
Second World War. The narratives, as well as the moral or didactic categories, 
are clearly distinct. On the other hand however, there are some similarities to be 
found in the policy frameworks created after 1995. Some characteristics of such 
policy mechanisms are a more pro-active role (national) authorities adopt in the 
construction of memories, a strong interconnectedness between public and private 
interests and an underlying driving meta-narrative of a national duty to remember 
connected to the target of an emotional and active investment of each individual 
citizen.
De herdenkingen van 100 jaar Grote Oorlog in België. Geschiedenis en de 
herinneringspolitiek
In België ontstond in de aanloop naar de herdenking van de Eerste Wereldoorlog 
(wwi) in 2014 een grote ‘herdenkingscompetitie’. De verschillende regeringen 
ontwikkelden hun eigen herdenkingsprogramma’s naast (en soms tegen) elkaar. In 
de slipstream daarvan zagen we een grote zakelijk-commerciële concurrentieslag om 
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wwi-onderzoek. Deze bijdrage plaatst eerst enkele kanttekeningen bij 
dat academische onderzoek. Vervolgens gaat deze bijdrage kort in op de 
herdenkings- en herinneringspolitiek van de diverse overheden in België. 
Enerzijds bevestigt (en versterkt) de huidige wwi-politiek een aantal verschillen 
met de herdenkingspolitiek rond de Tweede Wereldoorlog. De narratieven 
alsook de morele of didactische categorieën liggen ver uiteen. Anderzijds echter, 
worden ook overeenkomsten zichtbaar. Die bevinden zich bij de beleidskaders 
die na 1995 geleidelijk zijn gecreëerd. Enkele kenmerken van die gelijklopende 
beleidsmechanismen zijn: een veel pro-actievere rol van (nationale) overheden 
in de herinneringsconstructie, een sterke vermenging van overheids- en 
zakelijke belangen en een onderliggend duwend meta-narratief van nationale 
herinneringsplicht gekoppeld aan het streefdoel van een emotionele en actieve 
investering van elke burger.
Memorial competition
The Belgian centenary commemorations of the First World War (wwi) are the 
largest commemorative event the country has ever seen, fiercely discussed by 
policy-makers and academics, fiercely celebrated by the rest of the population. 
What immediately stands out is the political nature of these discussions 
(and, in a certain sense, of the celebrations as well). The driving force behind 
the commemorations is memorial competition between the different 
governments that make up the federal state of Belgium. But competition also 
exists between museums and cultural actors, in the tourist business and even 
between certain municipalities.1
The Flemish commemorative Action Plan of 2011 already showed 
great ambition, mainly in the domain of (international and national) tourism 
and international relations.2 Large public investments were made in ‘strategic 
projects’ (for example the In Flanders Fields Museum and the Passchendaele 
Memorial Museum) as well individual local projects.3 The overarching master 
narrative of central Flemish policy was a simple one: branding Flanders as a 
global centre for international peace and reconciliation.
Partly motivated by a sense of competition, the Francophone 
Community followed suit. Two commemorative resolutions (15 December 
2011 for the Walloon Region and 2 May 2012 for the Francophone 
Community) created a programme that rivalled the Flemish one in ambition, 
forum
financial investment and nation-branding. Three obvious differences stood 
out. The first was that there was much less overt attention to the front 
experience.4 Second, the Francophone programme inscribed itself in a 
Belgian national narrative. Third, there was a stronger connection between 
the commemorative programme and academia.5
The Belgian state itself lacked cultural competencies – and even when 
it still had them as a unitary state, it was consistently weak in developing a 
central politics of memory. In this competitive context however, the Belgian 
government decided to act by launching its own separate commemorative 
programme (summer 2011). Lacking a Belgian ministry of culture, the 
ministry of defence received the political responsibility. The appointment of 
commissioner-general Paul Breyne (the former governor of East Flanders) as 
central coordinator (March 2012) set things in motion and on 7 March 2013 
the Belgian parliament adopted its own commemorative resolution (under 
heavy protest from several of its Flemish nationalist members).6 Despite 
budgetary limitations this national Belgian programme did manage to 
create significant visibility in 2014, notably by integrating initiatives of the 
different communities, or simply by strategically using the historical Belgian 
framework connected to the Great War to its fullest potential (examples were 
the big opening ceremony in Liège on 4 August 2014 with delegations from 83 
countries, the ceremony in Ieper and Nieuwpoort on 28 October 2014; there is 
also a grand closing ceremony planned for 11 November 2018 in Brussels).
All of this meant that by 2014 not one, but three national 
commemoration programmes were underway in Belgium (not counting the 
bilingual programme of the Brussels Capital Region). Unsurprisingly, all of 
this provoked political debate and criticism, the latter initially aimed at the 
Flemish government for instrumentalising the Great War for petty nation-
branding.7 Admittedly, the Flemish government did make things easy for 
its critics. In the preparatory phase it was rather assertive, and dogmatically 
ignored the Belgian political dimension (and the Belgian historical framework 
of wwi). It sought international cooperation with over fifty states from 
which the Belgian state was conspicuously absent. This was ultimately 
4 Comines-Warneton was the only Walloon part of 
the Western front; a Centre of Interpretation was 
launched here called ‘Plugstreet 14-18 Experience’.
5 Professor Laurence Van Ypersele (Université 
Catholique de Louvain) presided over the 
preparatory working group and became lead 
coordinator of the commemoration programme. 
The Universities of Namur and Louvain La Neuve 
were involved in educational projects. The 
regional ministry of research financed three PhD 
research projects. The difference in academic 
involvement in the commemorations in each 
linguistic community is a structural issue. Nico 
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counterproductive for Flanders itself. The Flemish government was not 
harmed by the criticism from historians or from the Francophone community, 
but it had to bow before international protests.8 The confident go-it-alone 
attitude of Flanders before 2014 undermined its international position (and – 
ironically – its own master narrative of international peace and reconciliation, 
of which ‘intercultural dialogue’ was one explicit element).
In short, the centenary commemorations created unprecedented 
struggles over memory in Belgium. Where does this leave the history of the 
Great War and its historians? I will make two brief observations, firstly on 
the place of academic historians in the commemorations and secondly on 
dominant narrative(s) and politics of memory.
Poor little historians
Initially, Belgian academics took a critical position regarding the 
commemorations (albeit mainly the Flemish programme).9 Their main 
points of criticism were the lack of involvement of academic experts in policy 
choices, the lack of sufficient funding for fundamental research (both points 
raised against Flanders and later also against Belgium)10 and the ahistorical 
nature of certain dominant political and policy narratives. One example of 
the latter is the criticism (by leading wwi historians Sophie De Schaepdrijver 
and Laurence Van Ypersele) of the dominant (Flemish) narrative of the ‘absurd’ 
or ‘pointless’ war, arguing that for Belgium the war against the German 
aggressor was anything but pointless, instead representing what we would 
now call a ‘just war’).11
8 See one echo of this in: ‘A Century Later, New 
Rifts flare over World War i: Modern-Day 
Tensions emerge across Europe over how 
to Commemorate Great War’, The Wall Street 
Journal, 3 March 2015.
 This was best illustrated by the ‘In Flanders Fields 
Declaration’, an initiative meant to spearhead 
Flanders’ diplomatic strategy. After the Flemish 
refusal to include Belgium in this declaration 
had provoked international protest, the Flemish 
government was forced to cooperate with 
Belgium in 2013. On 6 January 2015, Flemish 
Premier Geert Bourgeois admitted before the 
Flemish parliament that the Declaration initiative 
would have to be abandoned. The reason 
cited was that the national commemorative 
approaches of all the different countries involved 
were simply too different. The Flemish Premier 
also said that several countries had expressed 
the opinion that ‘no more war’ was far too 
absolute a statement. For the parliamentary 
commission meeting of 6 January 2015, see: 
https://www.vlaamsparlement.be/commissies/
commissievergaderingen/943628/verslag/945424.
9 Birgit Leenknegt, Een klaprozenexplosie. Analyse 
van de kritieken van historici op 100 jaar Groote 
Oorlog in Vlaanderen, 2014-18 (Master Public 
History University of Amsterdam 2014).
10 Amongst others: ‘Hou historici niet buiten de 
deur’, Knack 7 (18 February 2015).
11 To support her argument, she drew parallels with 
current-day ‘just wars’. ‘Als morgen de salafisten 
hier binnenvallen, laten we hen dan begaan?’, 
Knack 45 (7 November 2013).
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
The Dutch PhD researcher Rose Spijkerman (UGent/Université Catholique de 
 Louvain) before the poster of her research on notions of honour and shame among 
the Belgian military during the First World War. With this poster, drs. Spijkerman 
won the first prize of the wwi-poster session during the ‘War and Fatherland’ 
conference in the Egmont Palace in Brussels (October 2015). No less than 34 PhD 
researchers are currently conducting research on wwi in Belgium.




















Academics also organised more general debates, reflecting on their 
position within such commemorative events. These debates never really 
went beyond confirming different positions. A good example was the closing 
roundtable on the ‘Belgian Day of Contemporary History’ on 9 May 2014 at 
the University of Antwerp, where in particular Pieter Lagrou (Université Libre de 
Bruxelles) and Laurence Van Ypersele (Université Catholique de Louvain) defended 
opposite viewpoints (the principle of academic autonomy vs. the principle of 
pragmatic active involvement). The debates never homed in on the potential 
mutual ground between these two opposite positions or unpacked the 
concrete elements that form part of this debate on principles.
Everyday commemorative reality in 2014 and beyond shows a nuanced 
image of the role of historians. On the one hand, academic historians do suffer 
from a certain public invisibility. Academic debates went by largely unnoticed 
by the broader public. The first centenary year of 2014 created a powerful 
combined cultural agency of books, large and small exhibitions, remembrance 
ceremonies, (digital) heritage projects, tv series and documentaries, all kinds 
of tourism-based events, a (very successful) musical, and the unavoidable wwi 
beer and chocolates.12 Academic historians were never a dominant voice. The 
majority of books, including the most visible and/or influential among them, 
even came from non-academics.13
On the other hand, academic historians are present and active. Some 
of them are visible and in the public eye (Sophie De Schaepdrijver hosted a 
documentary series on Flemish national tv). They act as experts in certain 
larger (local) projects such as exhibitions. They have a back-office job in 
project-evaluation committees, notably on the Belgian level. Some have 
played an active role in commemoration policies (Laurence Van Ypersele in 
Francophone Belgium most notably).
Even more essentially, academia was able to launch an impressive 
collective research effort. In 2016, no fewer than 34 young historians are 
conducting doctoral level research on Belgian wwi history. In some cases 
funding for this came from specific wwi calls or funding schemes, but even in 
the other cases it was the commemorative context that created the impetus 
for research proposals to be launched and funding to be approved.14 So under 
12 Tyne Cot military cemetery in Zonnebeke 
attracted nearly 650,000 visitors in 2014 (an 
increase of eighty percent relative to 2013) and 
the In Flanders Fields museum in Ypres attracted 
500,000 visitors (sixty-five percent more visitors 
relative to 2013). Tourist revenues in West-
Flanders in that year rose ninety-two percent 
compared to 2013. Flanders Today, 6 April 2015; 
‘Herdenkingstoerisme levert Westhoek 76,3 
miljoen euro omzet op’, De Standaard, 7 April 2015.
13 To name just one influential and highly successful 
non-academic book: Stefan Hertmans, Oorlog en 
Terpentijn (Amsterdam 2013).
14 This is notably the case for the memex research 
network (five researchers) coordinated by 
Laurence Van Ypersele, the Great War from Below 
research network (four researchers) coordinated 
by the author (both networks are funded by the 
Belgian federal Science Policy Level) and the three 
researchers funded by the Francophone community.
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the radar of the commemorative machine, academic historians have used the 
context to push forward their own impressive (and unprecedented) research 
agenda.
However, have they really done so? The impact of this research as well 
as its autonomy remains open to debate. While it is possible to detect certain 
schools and trends of research into wwi before 2014, the current field is so 
diverse that it is not entirely clear where pre-2014 research trends have gone 
now and whether we are experiencing a rupture with or a reinforcement of 
those research trends. Will this research have a broader social impact? Most of 
its results will reach a wider audience after 2018, when public interest might 
arguably have shifted to other domains. There is also the issue of the so-called 
‘autonomy’ of the academic agenda vis-à-vis the commemorations. No academic 
research is ever autonomous of the social context in which it emerges, but 
here the direct correlation between context and research is stronger than 
usual (at least in the Belgian context). It is noteworthy that most of the current 
fundamental historical research is national in its orientation. Despite the fact 
transnational perspectives were on the rise in pre-2014 Belgian wwi-research, 
current fundamental research has now (temporarily?) re-focused on the Belgian 
framework. One might hypothesise that research funding opportunities 
within any strong national commemorative context will tend to favour 
national issues and disinclined to fund too many transnational or international 
research subjects. The absence of political history – or history that explicitly 
tackles the Flemish-Belgian divide in the historical perspective of wwi – is 
another remarkable issue. Between the 1970s and 1990s this topic drove the 
majority of wwi-research.15 These observations are by no means a negative 
appreciation of ongoing wwi-research. The point is that the commemorative 
context most likely had a strong influence on the content of the research 
agenda – the choices for research topics – and has therefore steered Belgian 
wwi research in a different direction after 2014. For the moment, the centenary 
seems to leave academic historians as one of many actors that thrive in their 
closed academic sphere but hardly influence national historical consciousness.
States and politics of memory
The second observation concerns the politics of memory and the dominant 
narratives in this commemoration. In theory, one would assume that 
each state-sponsored national commemoration at least starts with an 
underlying master narrative. It is clear that current Belgian reality is 
more complex. Different types of actors, as well as governmental levels, 
15 Nico Wouters, ‘Historiography 1918-Today 
(Belgium)’, in: Ute Daniel e.a. (eds.), 1914-1918- 
online: International Encyclopedia of the First World 




















interfere, seemingly creating a multitude of competing narratives. This 
lack of a dominant narrative appears to be confirmed by local realities.16 
Every Belgian village or town has its own First World War commemoration 
activities, mostly built around specific elements of local wwi history. 
This creates an obvious divergence in themes but also in commemorative 
practices. Some localities rely on traditional (military) and historical 
tropes to commemorate, continuing the older and traditional narratives 
of national defeat and victimhood. Other towns tend to go for more 
innovative and artistic interpretations or try to use history to address more 
general, current issues.17 This commemorative diversity creates certain 
contradictions. One obvious contradiction is that between the creation of 
immersive and even aesthetically pleasing spectacles versus the narrative 
of the Great War as the absolute horror of industrial slaughter. The other 
most obvious contradiction is that between the competing policies of 
commemoration of the different national levels (especially Belgium and 
Flanders).
All these tensions however, seem to evaporate on the local level. 
There is certainly no tension between a Belgian and Flemish narrative on 
that level. Divergent and even contradictory trends can easily co-exist in 
this local memorial landscape. The local horizon itself is simply dominant. 
Even large national events are often rooted in a prominent local historic 
specificity – the events around the ‘martyred cities’ (Dinant, Leuven etc.), 
the opening national ceremony in Liège, the bridges event in Antwerp 
(recreating the pontoon bridges over the River Scheldt on 3-5 October 2014), 
the Light Front event (17 October 2014, 8400 torches illuminating the 
Westhoek frontline).
Another common trend – which might be considered as some kind of 
common narrative – is that of the common man (or woman or child) caught 
up in the destruction of an incomprehensible and ultimately absurd total war. 
Connected to this is a dominant preference in many projects to aim towards 
personal identification of audiences. The latter is done through the use of 
emotionally immersive techniques (scenography in exhibitions, music, light, 
16 Mélanie Bost, Le centenaire de la Grande Guerre en 
Belgique: Tour d’horizon des projets commémoratifs 
(Unpublished Report, cegesoma, Brussels 
February 2014). www.cegesoma.be/docs/media/
Accueil/MB_commemorations_texte_long.pdf.
17 The exhibition Ravaged (March-September 2014 
in Museum M in Leuven) used the destruction 
of the Leuven library in 1914 as the stepping 
stone for a more general reflection on the fate 
of cultural and artistic heritage during war and 
conflict. The exhibition Shock! 1914 (September 
2014-February 2015 in the Royal Library of 
Belgium) reflected on the role of the media in 
war. Border communities offer attention to the 
issue of Belgian refugees. In some cases, explicit 
parallels with current day refugee problems are 
drawn.
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and actors in films and documentaries), the use of individual life stories or the 
use of active physical participation of audiences (re-enactment for example, or 
active participation in tourist attractions).18 Most projects want to evoke basic 
emotional experiences among participants and spectators, thereby launching 
a process of personal identification. This approach of identification is mostly 
a continuation and reinforcement of the most essential, traditional core-
narrative of wwi commemorations, namely the pacifist one.
The older difference with the classic core-narrative of wwii therefore 
remains. Unlike the narrative of the ‘incomprehensible and absurd’ nature of 
the First World War, the Second World War remains the emblematic example 
of the ‘necessary war’ against the ultimate evil. This is not only simply because 
wwii was an ideological war and wwi was not (at least not initially). Another 
factor is that the old debate on the causes – and therefore the political or moral 
responsibilities – for the outbreak of wwi also remains unresolved (it flared 
up again briefly, for example after Christopher Clark’s 2012 book).19 Clear 
moral categories (right and wrong) still dominate wwii memories, but for wwi 
– with former belligerents joined by the unifying experience of blind mass 
slaughter and with a blundering Kaiser instead of a Hitler-figure – ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ have lost much of their use as clear political or didactic categories.
Although wwi and wwii narratives clearly differ, I would like to 
argue that an underlying commonality does exist in terms of the broader 
commemorative context, in particular regarding the (self-proclaimed) role 
of states. The legal commemorative context of the Centenary in Belgium 
first emerged as dominant during the 1990s. The national commemorations 
of the fifty-year anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 1995 
marked a turning point.20 One element of this turning point was that 
the (newly created) governmental levels in Belgium considered it to be a 
political imperative to actively steer and create memories, much more than 
the ‘old’ Belgian state had ever done. In both Flanders and the Francophone 
community, legislative confirmation of this came in 2009: with the creation of 
the Special Forum for Memory Education in Flanders and the Memory Decree 
of the Francophone community.
In the 1990s and 2000s, all of this was centred mostly on the classic 
human rights narratives directly tied to wwii. The differences between 
the World War narratives, however, should not blind us to the fact that the 
18 ‘Herdenking woi mag geen Vlaamse kermis zijn. 
Paul Breyne trekt van leer tegen commerciële 
herdenking’, Nieuwsblad, 9 March 2013; 
‘Herdenkingstoerisme levert Westhoek 76,3 
miljoen euro omzet op’, De Standaard, 7 April 2015.
19 Christopher M. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How 
Europe Went to War in 1914 (London 2012).
20 Nevertheless it must be noted that this paradigm 
shift occurred much earlier in classrooms and 
educational programmes, partly under the 
influence of unesco. See: Tessa Lobbes, Verleden 
zonder stof. De gedaanten van het heden in het 





















various wwi commemorative programmes in Belgium in fact are a practical 
application of this new legal and political memorial context. The main 
commonality is that of a state-imposed ‘duty to remember’ for populations, 
but also the self-imposed duty by governments and states actively to take a 
lead in this remembrance. Although the specific narratives will obviously 
differ (depending on the historic anniversary), common mechanisms occur: 
a strong synergy between state policies and the private sector, the attempt 
to impose a central narrative connecting the political and institutional state 
with the nation, and an underlying moral address to members of this nation 
to participate and feel personally involved. This moral duty to remember 
creates seamless policy connections between wwi and wwii memories. 
Just one practical example is Démocratie ou Barbarie. This policy cell for the 
Francophone community was created in 1994 and upgraded after the Memory 
Decree of 2009, mainly to coordinate peace education activities revolving 
around wwii narratives. In 2014 however, the task of offering support in 
coordinating wwi commemorations was added to its remit without any 
objections or contradictions. This policy commonality also explains why, in 
both Francophone and Flemish policy, even specific wwi narratives are easily 
translated into generic values that are ultimately specific translations of 
human rights values: (international) reconciliation, victim reparations and 
recognition, intercultural dialogue, democratic and civic education. On the 
surface, the three national programmes in Belgium use different narratives, 
but in order to reinforce their specific national identity, the three governments 
use generic and interchangeable underlying values.
We know very little about the actual reception or outcome of 
these state politics. Suffice to say that they do not always seem to have the 
intended outcome in terms of Flemish or Francophone nation-branding.21 
Paradoxically – and largely by accident – the Belgian level seems to come 
out of the centenary relatively strong. First, within this multitude of actors 
and narratives, the most basic historical framework simply emerges as 
a dominant anchor point, and with regard to wwi, that is still a Belgian 
historical framework. Second, the attempt to apply generic underlying 
‘human rights values’ to wwi is simply not very convincing. In this case, these 
commemorations have appeared fairly immune to all too evident political 
steering.
21 Within memory studies we still tend to examine 
the elitist construction of memories from above 
rather than the way these policies are actually 
received and perceived by local populations. 
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